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Introduction 
"We really have to watch where … we're walking. We limited our night movement because of the 
unexploded ordnance up on … this ridge."[1] 
US troops who were engaged in eastern Afghanistan to search out and destroy the caves used 
by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces described the area as being littered with US cluster bombs and 
unexploded ordnance, which caused great danger to troops as they searched the peak.[2] 
Recent studies of contemporary conflicts[3] have shown that the threat posed by Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW)[4] to the civil population as well as to peace keeping forces is of great 
humanitarian concern. Because of a lack of specific legal regulations on the issue of ERW, a 
large number of innocents have been killed or injured by ERW after conflicts have ended. Since 
the late 1990s, the issue of ERW has been listed on the agendas and comprehensively discussed 
during several conferences of experts and Meetings of States Parties to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).[5] However, the latest discussions have shown that there 
is still a lack of basic understanding of how imminent the threat is and how to deal with it. 
Explosive Remnants of War Defined 
During the last meetings of the Governmental Group of Experts to the CCW, several States 
proposed elements for a comprehensive definition of ERW. The Coordinator of this Group put 
forward a proposal with the following language[6]: 
"Explosive Remnants of War means unexploded ordnance[7] and abandoned explosive ordnance 
with the exception of anti-personnel mines, booby-traps, other devices and mines other than anti-
personnel mines as defined in Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996." 
This proposal reflects to a greater extent the broad understanding of most of the States Party to 
the CCW. However, although abandoned explosive ordnance are covered by this definition, one 
has to take into account that dangerous ERW normally represent types of munitions which have 
been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use or have in fact been used.[8] 
Abandoned munitions which are generally stored or lost but have not been primed, fused armed 
or otherwise prepared for use and have not been fired do not pose an immediate threat and thus, 
should not be considered as an important ERW issue. Too broad a definition could lead to a 
vague understanding which could have a negative impact on efforts to implement a new legally 
binding instrument. Accordingly, negotiators should keep their focus on a clear and 
implementable definition by focusing on ordnance which cause a direct and imminent threat. 
The Humanitarian Challenge 
Every year, a great number of civilians, humanitarian aid workers, members of international 
organizations and peace keeping troops are killed or injured by unexploded ordnance after a 
conflict has ended—unexploded ordnance which no longer serve any military purpose. According 
to a recent ICRC study on the impact of Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo, Cluster Bomb 
sub-munitions,[9] landmines and other unexploded ordnance killed or injured nearly 500 people in 
the year immediately following the end of the conflict. This figure corresponds to an annual rate of 
about 31 victims per 100,000 in civilian populations.[10] Another report which analyzed and 
compared unexploded ordnance and landmine accidents in Kosovo indicates that from June 1999 
to May 2001 unexploded ordnance caused a greater proportion of deaths than landmines.[11] 
While men are the most common victims of landmine accidents, about 61% of all unexploded 
ordnance accidents (excluding mines) affected children.[12] Laos, a particularly impacted country, 
still suffers the effect of unexploded ordnance nearly 30 years after the end of the conflict there. 
Since 1973, approximately 11,000 people have been killed or injured because of ERW.[13] 
However, civilians are not the only ones faced with the threat of ERW. During the 1991 Gulf War, 
the U.S. Armed Services recorded 177 accidents by unexploded ordnance, representing 13% of 
all US military casualties. Some 80 accidents were caused by unexploded cluster munitions.[14] 
In addition to the physical suffering, ERW have a severe negative impact on the local social and 
economical environment. Because of the everyday threat, agricultural land can no longer be tilled, 
many farmers lose their income and become dependent on external aid.[15] The presence of 
ERW hampers reconstruction efforts, and threatens international aid.[16] The repatriation of 
refugees becomes a difficult and dangerous task. Although repatriation has occurred quickly in 
Afghanistan,[17] insecurity regarding the refugee's safe return has increased. Further 
complicating the issue, many refugees appear undaunted by the news they receive from their 
often devastated communities regarding unexploded ordnance.[18] 
The Military Challenge 
The today's humanitarian threat caused by ERW is mainly the result of the use of highly explosive 
conventional munitions such as sub-munitions from cluster bomb systems, artillery shells or 
mortars, which do not explode after impact and thus litter the battlefield.[19] Large unitary bombs 
cause a problem but do not pose an imminent threat after the conflict. 
Although these munitions are a cause for humanitarian concern, they have a high military utility 
mainly because of the combination of powerful explosives and very sensitive fusing systems. 
With their highly explosive components, these ordnance can be deployed against armored as well 
as soft targets. In addition, with cluster ammunition systems it is possible to cover a great area 
with heavy fire within a short time using fewer rounds, thus increasing combat effectiveness. For 
example, a 60 second cluster bomb strike by one single multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) 
can deliver almost 8,000 sub-munitions and the coverage achieved is considered sufficient to 
neutralize a 500m x 500m target (comparable to an area of 30 soccer fields).[20] 
However, to have efficient munitions (and thus a high military value), the ordnance needs to have 
a high reliability. "A weapon that does not carry out the military task for which it is intended can 
never be the most effective weapon".[21] Additionally, it is important for the military that their 
weapons do not have a negative impact on further actions. A high dud rate of any explosive 
munitions used can hinder the success of future ground operations.[22] By introducing 
sophisticated types of munitions such as sub-munitions with back-up systems (e.g. self-
destruction or self-deactivation mechanisms)[23] combat effectiveness can be increased and the 
safety of friendly forces during combat operations (as well as of peacekeepers) can be 
enhanced.[24] In addition, the risk to civilians in post-conflict environments could be substantially 
reduced. 
Interim Conclusions 
The information outlined above shows that ERW pose an imminent threat in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Within the international community there is no question about the need for a new 
international instrument which reduces the threats caused by ERW. However, as stated, the 
munitions concerned also have a high military value. Thus, a new instrument has to balance both 
the humanitarian and the military aspects. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is a 
framework that allows negotiators to pay attention to the basic idea of International Humanitarian 
Law, the balance between humanitarian concerns and military necessities. Therefore, putting this 
issue on the CCW agenda was not only the right decision but an important one. 
The ERW challenge is broad and comprehensive. The tasks faced in the aftermath of war (i.e. the 
clearing of contaminated areas, the medical care of victims as well as the reconstruction efforts) 
are long-lasting and resource intensive. The CCW Meeting of State Parties decided last 
December to solve the ERW problem by dealing mainly with post-conflict measures.[25] 
However, the ERW threat is caused by the use of certain types of munitions. 
The post-conflict approach is certainly not a wrong approach. But it has to be emphasized that 
post-conflict measures do not reduce the amount of unexploded ordnance created during and 
directly after a conflict, thus, they do not directly reduce the danger. The only direct way to reduce 
the number of duds is by implementing new regulations regarding the reliability of munitions 
concerned. By improving the reliability of certain types of high explosives—by implementing 
preventive technical[26] as well as preventive generic measures[27]—the great number of 
unexploded munitions left in the field would be immediately reduced, and that would be in the 
interest of humanitarian agencies as well as the military. 
*PART II Explosive Remnants of War: The Way Forward* 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our WMD Resources 
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